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EXCLUSIVE: FBI ‘Granted FISA Warrant’ Covering Trump Camp’s Ties To Russia

By Louise Mensch | 10:18 pm, November 7, 2016

Two separate sources with links to the counter-intelligence community have confirmed to Heat Street that the FBI sought, and was granted, a FISA court warrant in October, giving counter-intelligence permission to examine the activities of ‘U.S. persons’ in Donald Trump’s campaign with ties to Russia.

https://heatst.com/world/exclusive-fbi-granted-fisa-warrant-covering-trump-camps-ties-to-russia/

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From the three reports, from the Guardian, Heat Street, and the New York Times, it appears the FBI had concerns about a private server in Trump Tower that was connected to one or two Russian banks. Heat Street describes these concerns as centering on “possible financial and banking offenses.” I italicize the word “offenses” because it denotes crimes. Ordinarily, when crimes are suspected, there is a criminal investigation, not a national-security investigation.

According to the New York Times (based on FBI sources), the FBI initially determined that the Trump Tower server did not have “any nefarious purpose.” But then, Heat Street says, “the FBI’s counter-intelligence arm, sources say, re-drew an earlier FISA court request around possible financial and banking offenses related to the server.”

Again, agents do not ordinarily draw FISA requests around possible crimes. Possible crimes prompt applications for regular criminal wiretaps because the objective is to prosecute any such crimes in court. (It is rare and controversial to use FISA wiretaps in criminal prosecutions.) FISA applications, to the contrary, are drawn around people suspected of being operatives of a (usually hostile) foreign power.

The Heat Street report continues:

The first [FISA] request, which, sources say, named Trump, was denied back in June, but the second was drawn more narrowly and was granted in October after evidence was presented of a server, possibly related to the Trump campaign, and its alleged links to two banks; [sic] SVB Bank and Russia’s Alfa Bank. While the Times story speaks of metadata, sources suggest that a FISA warrant was granted to look at the full content of emails and other related documents that may concern US persons. (A “US person” is a citizen or lawful permanent resident alien. Such people normally may not be subjected to searches or electronic eavesdropping absent probable cause of a crime; an exception is FISA, which — to repeat — allows such investigative tactics if there is probable cause that they are agents of a foreign power.)

Agents do not ordinarily draw FISA requests around possible crimes. Possible crimes prompt applications for regular criminal wiretaps, because the objective is to prosecute any such crimes in court.

Obviously, we haven’t seen the FBI affidavits (assuming they actually exist), and we do not know lots of other relevant facts. What we have, however, suggests that someone at the FBI initially had concerns that banking laws were being violated, but when the Bureau looked into it, investigators found no crimes were being committed. Rather than drop the matter for lack of evidence of criminal offenses, the Justice Department and FBI pursued it as a national-security investigation.

In June, an initial FISA affidavit (obviously prepared by the FBI and the Justice Department’s National Security Division) was submitted to the FISA court. It is said to have “named Trump” — but we don’t know whether that means (a) his name merely came up somewhere in the text of the affidavit or (b) he was an actual target whom the government wanted to investigate under FISA (meaning eavesdrop, read e-mail, and the like).

Even though the FISA standard is generally thought to be less demanding than the traditional wiretap standard (it is easier to show that someone may be colluding in some way with a foreign government than that he has committed a crime), the FISA court rejected the application that “named Trump.”

Five months later, the Justice Department and FBI submitted a second, more “narrowly” drawn affidavit to the FISA court. The way the Heat Street report is written intimates that Trump is not named in this October application for FISA surveillance. The tie to Trump also appears weak: Heat Street says the FISA court was presented with evidence of a server “possibly related” to the Trump campaign and its “alleged links” to two Russian banks.

To summarize, it appears there were no grounds for a criminal investigation of banking violations against Trump. Presumably based on the fact that the bank or banks at issue were Russian, the Justice Department and the FBI decided to continue investigating on national-security grounds. A FISA application in which Trump was “named” was rejected by the FISA court as overbroad, notwithstanding that the FISA court usually looks kindly on government surveillance requests. A second, more narrow application, apparently not naming Trump, may have been granted five months later; the best the media can say about it, however, is that the server on which the application centers is “possibly” related to the Trump campaign’s “alleged” links to two Russian banks — under circumstances in which the FBI has previously found no “nefarious purpose” in some (undescribed) connection between Trump Tower and at least one Russian bank (whose connection to Putin’s regime is not described).

That is tissue-thin indeed. It’s a good example of why investigations properly proceed in secret and are not publicly announced unless and until the government is ready to put its money where its mouth is by charging someone. It’s a good example of why FISA surveillance is done in secret and its results are virtually never publicized — the problem is not just the possibility of tipping off the hostile foreign power; there is also the potential of tainting U.S. persons who may have done nothing wrong. While it’s too early to say for sure, it may also be an example of what I thought would never actually happen: the government pretextually using its national-security authority to continue a criminal investigation after determining it lacked evidence of crimes.

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> From the three reports, from the Guardian, Heat
> Street, and the New York Times, it appears the FBI
> had concerns about a private server in Trump Tower
> that was connected to one or two Russian banks.
> Heat Street describes these concerns as centering
> on “possible financial and banking offenses.”
> I italicize the word “offenses” because it
> denotes crimes. Ordinarily, when crimes are
> suspected, there is a criminal investigation, not
> a national-security investigation.
>
> According to the New York Times (based on FBI
> sources), the FBI initially determined that the
> Trump Tower server did not have “any nefarious
> purpose.” But then, Heat Street says, “the
> FBI’s counter-intelligence arm, sources say,
> re-drew an earlier FISA court request around
> possible financial and banking offenses related to
> the server.”
>
> Again, agents do not ordinarily draw FISA requests
> around possible crimes. Possible crimes prompt
> applications for regular criminal wiretaps because
> the objective is to prosecute any such crimes in
> court. (It is rare and controversial to use FISA
> wiretaps in criminal prosecutions.) FISA
> applications, to the contrary, are drawn around
> people suspected of being operatives of a (usually
> hostile) foreign power.
>
> The Heat Street report continues:
>
> The first [FISA] request, which, sources say,
> named Trump, was denied back in June, but the
> second was drawn more narrowly and was granted in
> October after evidence was presented of a server,
> possibly related to the Trump campaign, and its
> alleged links to two banks; [sic] SVB Bank and
> Russia’s Alfa Bank. While the Times story speaks
> of metadata, sources suggest that a FISA warrant
> was granted to look at the full content of emails
> and other related documents that may concern US
> persons. (A “US person” is a citizen or lawful
> permanent resident alien. Such people normally may
> not be subjected to searches or electronic
> eavesdropping absent probable cause of a crime; an
> exception is FISA, which — to repeat — allows
> such investigative tactics if there is probable
> cause that they are agents of a foreign power.)
>
> Agents do not ordinarily draw FISA requests around
> possible crimes. Possible crimes prompt
> applications for regular criminal wiretaps,
> because the objective is to prosecute any such
> crimes in court.
>
> Obviously, we haven’t seen the FBI affidavits
> (assuming they actually exist), and we do not know
> lots of other relevant facts. What we have,
> however, suggests that someone at the FBI
> initially had concerns that banking laws were
> being violated, but when the Bureau looked into
> it, investigators found no crimes were being
> committed. Rather than drop the matter for lack of
> evidence of criminal offenses, the Justice
> Department and FBI pursued it as a
> national-security investigation.
>
> In June, an initial FISA affidavit (obviously
> prepared by the FBI and the Justice Department’s
> National Security Division) was submitted to the
> FISA court. It is said to have “named Trump”
> — but we don’t know whether that means (a) his
> name merely came up somewhere in the text of the
> affidavit or (b) he was an actual target whom the
> government wanted to investigate under FISA
> (meaning eavesdrop, read e-mail, and the like).
>
> Even though the FISA standard is generally thought
> to be less demanding than the traditional wiretap
> standard (it is easier to show that someone may be
> colluding in some way with a foreign government
> than that he has committed a crime), the FISA
> court rejected the application that “named
> Trump.”
>
> Five months later, the Justice Department and FBI
> submitted a second, more “narrowly” drawn
> affidavit to the FISA court. The way the Heat
> Street report is written intimates that Trump is
> not named in this October application for FISA
> surveillance. The tie to Trump also appears weak:
> Heat Street says the FISA court was presented with
> evidence of a server “possibly related” to the
> Trump campaign and its “alleged links” to two
> Russian banks.
>
> To summarize, it appears there were no grounds for
> a criminal investigation of banking violations
> against Trump. Presumably based on the fact that
> the bank or banks at issue were Russian, the
> Justice Department and the FBI decided to continue
> investigating on national-security grounds. A FISA
> application in which Trump was “named” was
> rejected by the FISA court as overbroad,
> notwithstanding that the FISA court usually looks
> kindly on government surveillance requests. A
> second, more narrow application, apparently not
> naming Trump, may have been granted five months
> later; the best the media can say about it,
> however, is that the server on which the
> application centers is “possibly” related to
> the Trump campaign’s “alleged” links to two
> Russian banks — under circumstances in which the
> FBI has previously found no “nefarious
> purpose” in some (undescribed) connection
> between Trump Tower and at least one Russian bank
> (whose connection to Putin’s regime is not
> described).
>
> That is tissue-thin indeed. It’s a good example
> of why investigations properly proceed in secret
> and are not publicly announced unless and until
> the government is ready to put its money where its
> mouth is by charging someone. It’s a good
> example of why FISA surveillance is done in secret
> and its results are virtually never publicized —
> the problem is not just the possibility of tipping
> off the hostile foreign power; there is also the
> potential of tainting U.S. persons who may have
> done nothing wrong. While it’s too early to say
> for sure, it may also be an example of what I
> thought would never actually happen: the
> government pretextually using its
> national-security authority to continue a criminal
> investigation after determining it lacked evidence
> of crimes.
>

Quote

As Inauguration Day approached, Obama White House officials grew convinced that the intelligence was damning and that they needed to ensure that as many people as possible inside government could see it, even if people without security clearances could not. Some officials began asking specific questions at intelligence briefings, knowing the answers would be archived and could be easily unearthed by investigators — including the Senate Intelligence Committee, which in early January announced an inquiry into Russian efforts to influence the election.

At intelligence agencies, there was a push to process as much raw intelligence as possible into analyses, and to keep the reports at a relatively low classification level to ensure as wide a readership as possible across the government — and, in some cases, among European allies. This allowed the upload of as much intelligence as possible to Intellipedia, a secret wiki used by American analysts to share information.

There was also an effort to pass reports and other sensitive materials to Congress. In one instance, the State Department sent a cache of documents marked “secret” to Senator Benjamin Cardin of Maryland days before the Jan. 20 inauguration. The documents, detailing Russian efforts to intervene in elections worldwide, were sent in response to a request from Mr. Cardin, the top Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, and were shared with Republicans on the panel.

“This situation was serious, as is evident by President Obama’s call for a review — and as is evident by the United States response,” said Eric Schultz, a spokesman for Mr. Obama. “When the intelligence community does that type of comprehensive review, it is standard practice that a significant amount of information would be compiled and documented.”

The opposite happened with the most sensitive intelligence, including the names of sources and the identities of foreigners who were regularly monitored. Officials tightened the already small number of people who could access that information. They knew the information could not be kept from the new president or his top advisers, but wanted to narrow the number of people who might see the information, officials said.

More than a half-dozen current and former officials described various aspects of the effort to preserve and distribute the intelligence, and some said they were speaking to draw attention to the material and ensure proper investigation by Congress. All spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were discussing classified information, nearly all of which remains secret, making an independent public assessment of the competing Obama and Trump administration claims impossible.

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/01/us/politics/obama-trump-russia-election-hacking.html?_r=0

Quote

> As Inauguration Day approached, Obama White House
> officials grew convinced that the intelligence was
> damning and that they needed to ensure that as
> many people as possible inside government could
> see it, even if people without security clearances
> could not. Some officials began asking specific
> questions at intelligence briefings, knowing the
> answers would be archived and could be easily
> unearthed by investigators — including the
> Senate Intelligence Committee, which in early
> January announced an inquiry into Russian efforts
> to influence the election.
>
> At intelligence agencies, there was a push to
> process as much raw intelligence as possible into
> analyses, and to keep the reports at a relatively
> low classification level to ensure as wide a
> readership as possible across the government —
> and, in some cases, among European allies. This
> allowed the upload of as much intelligence as
> possible to Intellipedia, a secret wiki used by
> American analysts to share information.
>
> There was also an effort to pass reports and other
> sensitive materials to Congress. In one instance,
> the State Department sent a cache of documents
> marked “secret” to Senator Benjamin Cardin of
> Maryland days before the Jan. 20 inauguration. The
> documents, detailing Russian efforts to intervene
> in elections worldwide, were sent in response to a
> request from Mr. Cardin, the top Democrat on the
> Foreign Relations Committee, and were shared with
> Republicans on the panel.
>
> “This situation was serious, as is evident by
> President Obama’s call for a review — and as
> is evident by the United States response,” said
> Eric Schultz, a spokesman for Mr. Obama. “When
> the intelligence community does that type of
> comprehensive review, it is standard practice that
> a significant amount of information would be
> compiled and documented.”
>
> The opposite happened with the most sensitive
> intelligence, including the names of sources and
> the identities of foreigners who were regularly
> monitored. Officials tightened the already small
> number of people who could access that
> information. They knew the information could not
> be kept from the new president or his top
> advisers, but wanted to narrow the number of
> people who might see the information, officials
> said.
>
> More than a half-dozen current and former
> officials described various aspects of the effort
> to preserve and distribute the intelligence, and
> some said they were speaking to draw attention to
> the material and ensure proper investigation by
> Congress. All spoke on the condition of anonymity
> because they were discussing classified
> information, nearly all of which remains secret,
> making an independent public assessment of the
> competing Obama and Trump administration claims
> impossible.
>
> https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/01/us/politics/oba
> ma-trump-russia-election-hacking.html?_r=0
>

Quote

> > As Inauguration Day approached, Obama White
> House
> > officials grew convinced that the intelligence
> was
> > damning and that they needed to ensure that as
> > many people as possible inside government could
> > see it, even if people without security
> clearances
> > could not. Some officials began asking specific
> > questions at intelligence briefings, knowing
> the
> > answers would be archived and could be easily
> > unearthed by investigators — including the
> > Senate Intelligence Committee, which in early
> > January announced an inquiry into Russian
> efforts
> > to influence the election.
> >
> > At intelligence agencies, there was a push to
> > process as much raw intelligence as possible
> into
> > analyses, and to keep the reports at a
> relatively
> > low classification level to ensure as wide a
> > readership as possible across the government
> —
> > and, in some cases, among European allies. This
> > allowed the upload of as much intelligence as
> > possible to Intellipedia, a secret wiki used by
> > American analysts to share information.
> >
> > There was also an effort to pass reports and
> other
> > sensitive materials to Congress. In one
> instance,
> > the State Department sent a cache of documents
> > marked “secret” to Senator Benjamin Cardin
> of
> > Maryland days before the Jan. 20 inauguration.
> The
> > documents, detailing Russian efforts to
> intervene
> > in elections worldwide, were sent in response to
> a
> > request from Mr. Cardin, the top Democrat on
> the
> > Foreign Relations Committee, and were shared
> with
> > Republicans on the panel.
> >
> > “This situation was serious, as is evident by
> > President Obama’s call for a review — and
> as
> > is evident by the United States response,”
> said
> > Eric Schultz, a spokesman for Mr. Obama.
> “When
> > the intelligence community does that type of
> > comprehensive review, it is standard practice
> that
> > a significant amount of information would be
> > compiled and documented.”
> >
> > The opposite happened with the most sensitive
> > intelligence, including the names of sources
> and
> > the identities of foreigners who were regularly
> > monitored. Officials tightened the already
> small
> > number of people who could access that
> > information. They knew the information could
> not
> > be kept from the new president or his top
> > advisers, but wanted to narrow the number of
> > people who might see the information, officials
> > said.
> >
> > More than a half-dozen current and former
> > officials described various aspects of the
> effort
> > to preserve and distribute the intelligence,
> and
> > some said they were speaking to draw attention
> to
> > the material and ensure proper investigation by
> > Congress. All spoke on the condition of
> anonymity
> > because they were discussing classified
> > information, nearly all of which remains
> secret,
> > making an independent public assessment of the
> > competing Obama and Trump administration claims
> > impossible.
> >
> >
> https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/01/us/politics/oba
>
> > ma-trump-russia-election-hacking.html?_r=0
> >