http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2012/10/us_officials_give_up_on_prospe.php
The once ambitious plan to use the surge to batter the Taliban to the peace table is now officially dead. Two main factors may be to blame:
* Congressional refusal to free several (5 in particular) Taliban/AQ leaders
* The Hawks within the Taliban outmaneuvered (and in some cases outgunned) the Doves
Basically, what it comes down to is the “Hawks” on both sides won out. FWIW, although Obama was widely criticized by his opponents for having even opened (unofficial) negotiations with the Taliban, there is no question that pre-9/11 there was a large, if not dominant, faction within the Taliban, including Mullah Omar himself, who were very much against Al Qaeda using
their county as a base from which to plan, train, launch and carry out military operations against the United States (including 9/11 itself). For people interested, the transcripts of the communications where Omar repeatedly told bin Laden to stop fucking his shit up (in so many words) have been de-classified. Obama saw a possible opportunity to exploit the divide, lingering resentments and differeing strategic outlooks between these various factions.
Saudi Arabia was one of 3 countries that even recognized the Taliban, yet bin Laden would release speeches calling for the overthrow of the Saudi government. After AQ hit the two embassies in Africa in 1998 things were relatively quiet on that front for a time but in Oct 2000 one can only imagine Omar’s reaction when he turned on the news to find out that a 50 foot hole had been ripped through the side of a destroyer in the Gulf of Yemen. Clinton tried to take out Omar with cruise missile strikes after this. We all know what happened next.
The point is that there absolutely were elements within the Taliban that looked at these Arabs (Al Qaeda in particular) as outsiders who took advantage of their hospitality and were very inconsiderate of their Afghan hosts, if not reckless in their actions, and ultimately wound up costing them their country because of it. One major difference between AQ and the other Jihadist organizations training in Afghanistan at the time is that the other groups (such as Zarqawi’s which was focused on overthrowing the Jordanian regime…before the invasion of Iraq, that is) is that bin Laden was absolutely focused on carrying out a “spectacular attack” on US soil (the "far-enemy"). Other “near-enemy” oriented groups sought to organize, plan and train in Afghanistan so that they could overthrow the ‘apostate’ regimes back in their respective countries of origin or join the battles in places such as Chechnya or Bosnia. Many Jihadists operating out of Afghanistan (and elsewhere) during the reign of the Taliban looked at an altercation with the US as a foolish if not suicidal venture and resent(ed) AQ for dragging the whole jihadist caravan into this altercation..
Nonetheless, the Taliban that now remain are likely the more hawkish ones. The doves probably threw down their swords and returned to society years ago. There were several documented incidents of violence between various factions of the Taliban earlier this year (quite possibly over whether or not to negotiate with the US). While the chances of the US having ever reached an acceptable (on US terms) peace deal with the Taliban were probably remote at best, it was still worth looking into, IMO, for the reasons I outlined above. Regardless, it is now officially a dead issue.
Still, I find it rather annoying to hear
people who have no real understanding of the complexities involved with this issue get up on their soap box and start bitching really loud about the fact that Obama
considered talks with the Taliban. The fact that Obama was willing to entertain this option, IMO, shows that he did in fact understand the enemy from the enemy's perspective.
Damn, this post got long! I really didn't intend to write a book here...it just kind of happened.