https://www.brienrochelaw.com/attorney-practice/professional-liability/legal-malpractice/
https://www.hallandsethi.com/legal-malpractice/
https://www.jeremiahdenton.com/practice-areas/legal-malpractice/
https://bartolicainwason.com/legal-malpractice
https://www.breitcantor.com/legal-malpractice/
https://www.jeremiahdenton.com/practice-areas/legal-malpractice/
https://www.jordancoyne.com/legal-malpractice/
https://www.grenierlawgroup.com/legal-malpractice/
http://www.thelawparty.org/virginia/legal_malpractice_lawyers.php
https://www.halperinlegal.com/richmond-legal-malpractice-lawyer/

160381 Moonlight Enterprises v. Mroz 03/30/2017 In a legal malpractice action, dismissal of claims against one of the defendants on statute of limitations grounds is affirmed, but dismissal of claims against the second defendant is reversed. Under the continuous-representation rule, when malpractice is claimed to have occurred during the representation of a client by an attorney with respect to a particular undertaking or transaction, the statute of limitations begins to run when the attorney’s services rendered in that connection have terminated, notwithstanding the continuation of a general attorney-client relationship, and irrespective of the attorney’s work on other undertakings or transactions for the same client. The circuit court in this case correctly found that the three-year limitation period barred malpractice claims against the first attorney because his work on the particular undertaking at issue had ceased more than three years before plaintiff filed the present malpractice action. It erred in regard to the second defendant, however, since he continued to render services with respect to the undertaking involved until four days after the date a judgment order was actually entered, and the present action was filed three years to the day after that judgment was entered. The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
http://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/opnscvwp/1160381.pdf


141239 Desetti v. Chester 06/04/2015 In a legal malpractice action against criminal defense counsel, the plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving that the pecuniary injury for which recovery is sought was proximately caused by the attorney's negligence and was not proximately caused by the malpractice plaintiff’s own criminal actions, and here the circuit court did not err in sustaining the demurrers of the defendant attorney and law firm. Where it is alleged that an attorney’s malpractice resulted in a more severe conviction or longer sentence than necessary, the complaint must allege that the pecuniary injuries alleged would not have been proximately caused by a less severe conviction or lesser sentence. In such cases, the analysis must consider whether the injuries pled were proximately caused by legal malpractice rather than the legal malpractice plaintiff's own criminal actions. In this case, the plaintiff failed to satisfy her burden of pleading that the pecuniary damages she seeks to recover were proximately caused by her attorney's legal malpractice, rather than being proximately caused by her criminal actions. The circuit court's judgment sustaining the defendants’ demurrer is affirmed.
http://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/opnscvwp/1141239.pdf

140500 Shevlin Smith v. McLaughlin 02/26/2015 In a legal malpractice claim, the circuit court erred in denying a plea in bar addressing one of the alleged grounds for liability, failure to correctly anticipate a judicial ruling on an unsettled legal issue, and erred in holding that collectibility of a judgment is not probative of legal malpractice damages. Tort damages - including non-pecuniary damages for emotional distress and humiliation - are not recoverable for breach of contract, nor are wrongful incarceration and its attendant non-pecuniary damages. A plaintiff may not request from the jury, in either opening statement or closing, an amount of damages that exceeds plaintiff's ad damnum. Denial of the partial plea in bar and the circuit court's order affirming the jury award are reversed, the award is vacated, and the case is remanded.
http://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/opnscvwp/1140500.pdf

091378 Wintergreen Partners v. McGuireWoods 09/16/2010 The circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment to a law firm sued for malpractice in failing timely to file transcripts on appeal on behalf of a client held liable for $8.3 million in a personal injury premises liability suit. Because jury instructions in that underlying injury action concerning an entity's exposure to liability independent of respondeat superior liability for the negligence of its employees were not objected to, and thus became law of the case, reversal was not available in the dismissed appeal based upon the theory that exoneration of the employees by the jury precluded imposition of liability on the entity. Therefore the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment for the law firm is affirmed in the present malpractice action because the plaintiff could not meet the standard for proving a valid legal malpractice claim.
http://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/opnscvwp/1091378.pdf

091659 Van Dam v. Gay 09/16/2010 In an action for legal malpractice, the circuit court correctly held that a wife’s legal injury arising out of the alleged malpractice in drafting divorce property settlement papers occurred when the court entered a final decree of divorce in 1986, terminating the defendant’s employment in the matter in which he was engaged. The wife’s right of action accrued and the statute of limitations began to run on that date instead of the date that the divorce decree was ultimately deemed insufficient to entitle the wife to survivor's benefits under her former husband's retirement plans. The circuit court did not err in sustaining the plea in bar and its judgment is affirmed.
http://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/opnscvwp/1091659.pdf


080751 Williams v. Joynes 06/04/2009 In a legal malpractice action alleging failure timely to file a Virginia personal injury action, the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendant attorneys based on the view that the plaintiff’s failure to file a similar action in a foreign jurisdiction with a longer statute of limitations was a superseding event, which severed the link of proximate causation between the defendants’ negligence and plaintiff's loss of his personal injury claim. Since the attorneys' conduct set in motion the need for plaintiff to consider filing a lawsuit elsewhere, as a matter of law the argument that his failure to file a lawsuit in another jurisdiction was a superseding cause that relieved them of liability must fail. The fact that one of the other vehicle drivers was not subject to suit in the other state also demonstrates that plaintiff's decision regarding litigation in another state could not have severed completely the link of proximate causation between the defendant attorneys' negligence and plaintiff's loss of his personal injury claim against that other driver. It was error to grant partial summary judgment to the defendants and the circuit court’s judgment is reversed. The case is remanded for a trial on the merits of the cause.
http://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/opnscvwp/1080751.pdf


060248 Barrett v. Virginia State Bar 09/15/2006 Concerning charges of attorney misconduct, that part of a judgment of a three-judge court holding that certain actions taken by an attorney during his divorce proceeding violated Rules 4.4, 8.4(b), 3.1 and 3.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct is affirmed, but that part holding that his actions regarding representation of a personal injury client and an ensuing legal malpractice action violated Rules 1.1 and 1.3 is reversed. The sanction imposed is vacated and the case remanded for consideration of an appropriate sanction for the affirmed violations.
http://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/opnscvwp/1060248.pdf

050333 Cox v. Geary 01/13/2006 A plaintiff who was wrongly convicted of criminal charges suffered one indivisible injury in the conviction and imprisonment, giving rise to one cause of action. His release of the Commonwealth after the General Assembly passed a compensation bill which he accepted, bars a legal malpractice claim against his former defense counsel. The Commonwealth and his former attorneys are not joint tortfeasors with respect to the wrongful incarceration, and thus Code § 8.01-35.1 is inapplicable. Under common law, his unconditional release of the Commonwealth bars recovery against his former counsel for the same injury, regardless of the theory on which the later claim is based. The judgment dismissing plaintiff's legal malpractice claims is affirmed.
http://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/opnscvwp/1050333.pdf

030500 Shipman v. Kruck 03/05/2004 A cause of action for legal malpractice accrued at the time of the attorney's breach, subject to the continuous representation rule. Therefore, the plaintiffs had three years from the end of the attorney's representation of them in which to file their claim. Since the action was commenced almost three years and eight months later, the trial court did not err in granting the defendant's plea in bar of the statute of limitations. The judgment is affirmed. (Revised 3/31/04)
http://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/opnscvwp/1030500.pdf

020923 Taylor v. Davis 02/28/2003 The circuit court erred in dismissing a legal malpractice action on demurrers where the plaintiff pled that his former criminal defense attorneys were negligent in allowing him to suffer a conviction, incarceration, monetary loss and other damages, because the purported offense for which he was convicted did not constitute a crime and that he was unable to establish actual innocence because of the attorneys' negligence. The judgment is reversed and the case remanded.
http://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/opnscvwp/1020923.pdf

020338 Whitley v. Chamouris 01/10/2003 The trial court did not err in holding that expert testimony was not required in order to prove proximate causation in a legal malpractice action. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
http://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/opnscvwp/1020338.pdf

012612 Rutter v. Jones Blechman Woltz and Kelly 09/13/2002 In a legal malpractice action in which the administrator of a decedent's estate alleged that the defendant attorneys negligently prepared decedent's testamentary documents, the trial court properly sustained the defendants' demurrer, and that judgment is affirmed.
http://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/opnscvwp/1002900.pdf

000785 Simmons v. Miller 04/20/2001 The trial court did not err in ruling on individual and derivative claims brought by a shareholder in a closely held corporation, claims for statutory conspiracy under Code §§ 18.2- 499 and -500, a legal malpractice claim, and a claim for conversion. The court erred in failing to set aside a verdict enforcing a restrictive employment covenant. The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. (Revised 5/2/01)
http://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/opnscvwp/1000785.pdf

960327 Adkins v. Dixon 02/28/1997 In this legal malpractice case the former court-appointed attorney for the plaintiff was not entitled to sovereign immunity and the trial court erred in sustaining the plea of immunity. However, the plaintiff had the burden of alleging and proving as a part of his cause of action that he was innocent and that he obtained post-conviction relief and, therefore, the trial court should have sustained the
http://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/opnscvwp/1960327.pdf

The Supreme Court Of Virginia has "consistently held that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, even if asserted during proceedings in the circuit court, are not reviewable on direct appeal, but must be raised in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after exhaustion of all appellate remedies. Sigmon v. Dir. of the Dep't of Corr., 285 Va. 526, 533, 739 S.E.2d 905 (2013)."
https://www.leagle.com/decision/invaco20181213h02

USA v TEKOA TOBIAS GLOVER, Finding of Ineffective Assistance by Court Appointed
counsel that coerce a guilty plea.
https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/194801.p.pdf

Defendants in Crimnal Cases have right to a 6-month delayed appeal due to Attorney Misconduct.



§ 19.2-321.2. (Effective January 1, 2022) Motion in the Supreme Court for delayed appeal in criminal cases.
A. Filing and content of motion. When, due to the error, neglect, or fault of counsel representing the appellant, or of the court reporter, or of the Court of Appeals or the circuit court or an officer or employee of either, an appeal from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court in a criminal case has (i) never been initiated; (ii) been dismissed for failure to adhere to proper form, procedures, or time limits in the perfection of the appeal; (iii) been dismissed in part because at least one assignment of error contained in the petition for appeal did not adhere to proper form or procedures; or (iv) been denied or the conviction has been affirmed, for failure to file or timely file the indispensable transcript or written statement of facts as required by law or by the Rules of Supreme Court; then a motion for leave to pursue a delayed appeal may be filed in the Supreme Court within six months after the appeal has been dismissed or denied, the conviction has been affirmed, or the Court of Appeals judgment sought to be appealed has become final, whichever is later. Such motion shall identify by the style, date, and Court of Appeals record number of the judgment sought to be appealed, and, if one was assigned in a prior attempt to appeal the judgment to the Supreme Court, shall give the record number assigned in the Supreme Court in that proceeding, and shall set forth the specific facts establishing the said error, neglect, or fault. If the error, neglect, or fault is alleged to be that of an attorney representing the appellant, the motion shall be accompanied by the affidavit of the attorney whose error, neglect, or fault is alleged, verifying the specific facts alleged in the motion, and certifying that the appellant is not personally responsible, in whole or in part, for the error, neglect, or fault causing loss of the original opportunity for appeal.

B. Service, response, and disposition. Such motion shall be served on the attorney for the Commonwealth and the Attorney General, in accordance with Rule 5:4 of the Supreme Court. If the Commonwealth disputes the facts alleged in the motion, or contends that those facts do not entitle the appellant to a delayed appeal under this section, the motion shall be denied without prejudice to the appellant's right to seek a delayed appeal by means of petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Otherwise, the Supreme Court shall, if the motion meets the requirements of this section, grant appellant leave to initiate or re-initiate pursuit of the appeal from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.

C. Time limits when motion granted. If the motion is granted, all computations of time under the Rules of Supreme Court shall run from the date of the order of the Supreme Court granting the motion, or if the appellant has been determined to be indigent, from the date of the order by the circuit court appointing counsel to represent the appellant in the delayed appeal, whichever is later.

D. Applicability. The provisions of this section shall not apply to cases in which the appellant is responsible, in whole or in part, for the error, neglect, or fault causing loss of the original opportunity for appeal, nor shall it apply in cases where the claim of error, neglect, or fault has already been alleged and rejected in a prior judicial proceeding.

2005, c. 836; 2011, c. 278; 2017, cc. 77, 79; 2021, Sp. Sess. I, cc. 344, 345, 489.



https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title19.2/chapter19/section19.2-321.2/